Moral Relativism

Atheism — Claim Examined

What Atheism Claims

Atheism cannot account for objective moral values yet smuggles them in to condemn evil.

“Nietzsche, The Gay Science §125 (1882)”

The Claim — In Their Own Framing

Thoughtful atheists argue that objective moral truths either do not exist or, if they do, they do not require God. On one side, moral anti-realists like J. L. Mackie maintain that belief in objective values is a pervasive error because such values would be “queer” entities, unlike anything in a naturalistic ontology (Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, ch. 1). Evolutionary debunkers (e.g., Sharon Street; Richard Joyce) contend that our moral beliefs are best explained by adaptive pressures shaping pro-social dispositions, not by tracking stance-independent moral facts; hence putative objectivity is explanatorily superfluous. On the other side, secular moral realists (e.g., Russ Shafer-Landau; Derek Parfit; David Enoch) hold that there are robust, non-natural or sui generis moral truths and reasons, cognizable by rational reflection, without appeal to theism. Utilitarians like Peter Singer add that we can justify normative claims by impartial concern for suffering that coheres with our best empirical understanding of sentience. Nietzsche’s prophetic “God is dead” (The Gay Science §125) highlights the cultural gravity of severing morality from transcendence, but many atheists answer that post-theistic societies can construct moral frameworks through reason, empathy, and human flourishing. Intelligent people embrace this view because it promises explanatory parsimony (no supernatural posits), aligns with evolutionary psychology and cognitive science, and preserves a demanding ethics grounded in shared human interests rather than divine command.

Where This Fails

**No God, no 'ought': naturalism lacks the ontological furniture for binding normativity**

Atheistic naturalism excels at describing what is, but prescriptive 'oughts' are categorically different. Mackie admits that if there were objective values, they would be metaphysically and epistemologically 'queer' in a natural world. Secular realists attempt to retain such normativity as brute, non-natural facts, but this looks ad hoc within an otherwise parsimonious ontology. Evolutionary explanations (e.g., Street; Joyce) further pressure the view: if moral cognition is shaped primarily by reproductive fitness, not truth-tracking, why think it coincidentally aligns with stance-independent moral facts? The theistic framework explains intrinsic normativity by rooting it in the character and will of a transcendent Lawgiver (tov/ra‘; righteousness grounded in God’s nature), making moral facts neither inexplicable aliens nor evolutionary accidents. Contra naturalism’s explanatory gap, theism supplies ontological grounding for categorical reasons and duties that purport to bind all rational agents.

**Atheist moral outrage presupposes objective evil while denying any transcendent moral standard**

Many atheists rightly condemn genocide, racism, or cruelty as truly evil. Yet if morality reduces to preferences, conventions, or adaptive psychology, such condemnation cannot rise above 'I/we dislike this.' Richard Rorty-style deflationary talk of solidarity cannot underwrite categorical wrongness—only communal disapproval. But moral discourse we actually use is thick with universality and authority: some acts are wrong even if majorities approve. Isaiah’s 'woe to those who call evil (ra‘) good' (Isa 5:20) captures this universal structure: moral predicates claim an authority beyond local taste. Romans 2:14–15 describes the law written on the heart (nomos... graphon en tais kardiais), explaining why conscience (syneidēsis) protests even against our interests. On a purely immanent standard, however, the language of real injustice becomes performative overreach—smuggling in the very objectivity naturalism officially rejects.

**Evolutionary debunking undercuts confidence in moral belief unless a truth-aiming source is supplied**

Sharon Street’s 'Darwinian Dilemma' shows that if evolution molded moral judgment for fitness, robust realism faces a nasty coincidence problem: why would selection produce beliefs aligning with stance-independent moral truths? Richard Joyce pushes the point toward moral fictionalism. Secular realists reply that rational reflection can correct adaptive heuristics. But if our basic normative intuitions are shaped by non-truth-aiming processes, what epistemic right do we have to trust them—even after reflection—absent a tether to an objective source? Theism offers a teleology for our practical reason: humans made be-tzelem Elohim (in the image of God, Gen 1:27) are designed for moral cognition that, though fallible, is aimed at truths grounded in the divine nature. Without such grounding, the debunking argument leaves realist atheism epistemically under-motivated and anti-realism normatively impotent.

**Human dignity and rights fit the imago Dei; secular substitutes struggle to universalize without fiat**

Secular ethicists champion human rights and equal dignity. Yet on naturalism, why think all humans possess equal, inalienable worth regardless of capacity? Utilitarianism (Singer) risks ranking lives by sentience or utility; contractualism risks provincial boundaries of the 'contract.' Attempts to stipulate dignity as a basic normative fact (Shafer-Landau; Parfit) restore what theism explains: worth inhering in persons because they reflect God’s character (tzelem Elohim), not because of contingent traits. Psalm 14:1’s fool (nabal) who says 'ein Elohim' misjudges reality, and the result is moral corrosion—'they have done abominable deeds'—not as an ad hominem, but as an anthropological warning: deny the Ground, and the edifice wobbles. Theism better accounts for the unconditional, universal moral status we intuit, defend in courts, and invoke against every tribe and age.

Primary Source Evidence

Nietzsche’s 'The Madman' (The Gay Science §125) announces: 'God is dead… and we have killed him.' He then asks, 'What festivals of atonement, what sacred games shall we have to invent?' The point is not glee but diagnostic dread: if the transcendent frame collapses, the West must either reinvent moral ceremonials or confront nihilism. Nietzsche understood that Judaeo-Christian categories—guilt, atonement, virtue—did cultural work. Post-theism must manufacture replacements or accept that evaluative talk loses its objectivist bite. Subsequent naturalists split: some embrace constructivism or expressivism; others attempt realism without God. But Nietzsche’s insight stands: severing the 'sun' (transcendent source) leaves us in a normative twilight. A theistic account answers the crisis not by cultural reinvention but by returning to the ontological wellspring: moral predicates reflect God’s holy character, not human projection, preserving both normativity and motivation without invention.

J. L. Mackie’s error theory articulates a crucial concession from within atheism: 'There are no objective values' (Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, ch. 1). His 'argument from queerness' observes that irreducible moral properties would be unlike anything admitted by a strictly naturalistic worldview—both in metaphysics (objective prescriptivity) and epistemology (a faculty to detect such properties). Many naturalists quietly adopt non-cognitivism or constructivism to avoid this queerness, but then universal condemnation—say, of genocide as wrong regardless of approval—loses its moorings. Secular realists try to accept the 'queer' and posit sui generis moral facts. Yet this move seems to invite the very ontological and epistemic burdens Mackie pressed. Theism, by contrast, houses categorical normativity in the character and commands of a personal Lawgiver, making 'ought' intrinsic to reality rather than a late-emerging anomaly in an otherwise descriptive cosmos.

Sharon Street’s 'A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value' argues that if our evaluative attitudes are shaped by evolutionary forces tracking fitness, then robust realism faces either implausible convergence or massive skepticism. Richard Joyce adds that our moral sense can be explained as adaptive fiction—useful, not truth-aimed (The Evolution of Morality). Realists respond that reflective equilibrium and rational intuition can sift error. But if the basic contents and dispositions of conscience are products of non-truth-tracking causes, why trust their outputs as knowledge of stance-independent truths? Romans 2:14–15 describes the law 'written on their hearts'—syneidēsis not as mere adaptive programming but as a witness implanted by the Creator—fitting the datum that conscience often indicts us against self-interest. Theism thereby undercuts the debunking force by supplying a teleological and truth-aimed origin for our moral cognition.

Secular ethicists offer sophisticated systems: Singer’s impartial utilitarianism, Parfit’s objective reasons, Shafer-Landau’s non-natural moral facts. But each faces a grounding challenge. Utilitarianism can justify intuitively abhorrent trade-offs if they maximize aggregate utility; contractualism risks parochial exclusions; brute-fact realism asserts what needs explaining—why categorical reasons bind us. By contrast, Genesis 1:27’s tzelem Elohim anchors dignity in creation: persons bear divine image regardless of ability, tribe, or stage of development. Isaiah 5:20 warns against moral inversion, assuming a standard transcending culture. Psalm 14:1 diagnoses the practical fallout of denying God. The moral argument thus proceeds: if objective moral values and duties exist, God exists; objective moral values and duties do exist; therefore, God exists. Naturalistic accounts either evacuate objectivity or posit it without ontological warrant, while biblical theism supplies both source and summons.

Citations

  1. Friedrich Nietzsche. The Gay Science. Vintage, 1974 (trans. Walter Kaufmann), §125 ('The Madman').
  2. J. L. Mackie. Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. Penguin, 1977, Chapter 1 ('There Are No Objective Values').
  3. Sharon Street. A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value. Philosophical Studies 127(1), 2006, pp. 109–166.
  4. Richard Joyce. The Evolution of Morality. MIT Press, 2006, Chapter 6 (Evolutionary Debunking).
  5. Russ Shafer-Landau. Moral Realism: A Defence. Oxford University Press, 2003, Chapter 1 (Moral Realism Stated).
  6. Peter Singer. Practical Ethics (3rd ed.). Cambridge University Press, 2011, Chapter 1 (About Ethics).
  7. Derek Parfit. On What Matters. Oxford University Press, 2011, Vol. 1, general argument for objective reasons.
  8. The Holy Bible. English Standard Version. Crossway, 2016, Gen 1:27; Ps 14:1; Isa 5:20; Rom 2:14–15.

Related Reading

Key Scripture References

ReProof.AI Verdict

Without a transcendent lawgiver, moral statements collapse into preference.